Moral Experience: Perception or Emotion? by Hutton, James
 1 
Moral Experience: 
Perception or Emotion? 
James Hutton, University of Edinburgh 
Forthcoming in Ethics 
Abstract 
One solution to the problem of moral knowledge is to claim that we can acquire it a posteriori through moral 
experience. But what is a moral experience? When we examine the most compelling putative cases, we find 
features which, I argue, are best explained by the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. To preempt 
an objection, I argue that putative cases of emotionless moral experience can be explained away. Finally, I 
allay the worry that emotions are an unsuitable basis for moral knowledge. I conclude that those who believe 
in moral experience should hold that it consists of emotion. 
1. Introduction 
How do we know right from wrong? According to the moral rationalist we must begin by working 
out a set of principles a priori. When we encounter a specific situation, we perceive its non-moral 
features and subsume them under the relevant principles, thus reaching a judgment about what 
ought to be done in this case. On occasion the contingencies of everyday life might jog us into 
recognizing a moral principle we hadn’t previously thought of. But strictly speaking, experience is 
dispensable: it is epistemically irrelevant for moral knowledge, except insofar as it tells us about the 
arrangement of non-moral features in the actual world. Moral knowledge rests on reason alone, the 
rationalist maintains. 
On the contrary, the moral empiricist holds that experience matters deeply for moral 
knowledge. Perhaps she is skeptical of reason’s powers but unwilling to deny the possibility of moral 
knowledge,1 or perhaps she thinks our judgments about cases sometimes go beyond what we can 
capture in abstract principles. Either way, she thinks our experiences of specific situations can reveal 
the moral landscape to us in a manner that is not reducible to rational intuition, inference, or 
conceptual competence. According to the moral empiricist, the foundation of moral knowledge is 
moral experience. 
 
1 Another option, which I set aside, is moral coherentism. See Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ‘Coherentist Epistemology and 
Moral Theory’, in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral Epistemology, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 137–89. Moral coherentism seems vulnerable to the problem of coherent yet 
reprehensible moral outlooks. I’ll also set aside any forms of antirealism or expressivism that are incompatible with talk 
of moral knowledge, though proponents of such views may be interested in the nature of moral experience for other 
reasons. 
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There was certainly a time when the notion of moral experience sounded fanciful to analytic 
philosophers.2 (Perhaps it still does to some readers.) But now, moral experience is taken seriously as 
an account of how moral knowledge is possible. To make the account defensible though, more 
needs to be said about what a moral experience is. Let’s make this requirement more precise by 
clarifying the term “moral experience”. The moral empiricist claims there are cases in which agents 
form moral beliefs not through inference, nor on the basis of rational intuition, but on the basis of 
something else. “Moral experience” refers to whatever this something else is—this mental state upon 
which agents base their non-inferential, a posteriori moral beliefs. The moral empiricist needs to tell 
us what this something else is. She needs to identify the mental state which, in putative cases of moral 
experience, causes people to form new moral beliefs and which, when things go well, provides a 
sufficient basis for those beliefs to constitute knowledge. The aim of this article is to do just this, to 
settle on an account of what moral experience is. Specifically, I will adjudicate between the two 
leading ways of filling out moral empiricism. On the one hand, we have 
Perceptual Intuitionism: Moral experiences consist of perceptual experiences with moral 
content.3 
 
2 For instance, Mackie dismisses it out of hand and writers at the beginning of the recent resurgence, such as Richard 
Werner, seem to expect an incredulous stare from their readers. John L Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: 
Penguin, 1977), 38–39; Richard Werner, ‘Ethical Realism’, Ethics 93, no. 4 (1983): 285, https://doi.org/10.1086/292487. 
3 The notion of perception with moral content or, equivalently, perception of moral properties is defended by the 
following authors. David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); John Greco, Putting Skeptics in Their Place 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 231–48; Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley, ‘Pollyanna Realism: 
Moral Perception and Moral Properties’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 1 (2002): 75–85; Terence Cuneo, 
‘Reidian Moral Perception’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, no. 2 (2003): 229–58, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2003.10716542; Sarah McGrath, ‘Moral Knowledge by Perception’, Philosophical 
Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 209–28, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00026.x; Peter Goldie, ‘Seeing What Is 
the Kind Thing to Do: Perception and Emotion in Morality’, Dialectica 61, no. 3 (2007): 347–61, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01107.x; Jennifer Lyn Wright, ‘The Role of Moral Perception in Mature 
Moral Agency’, in Moral Perception, ed. J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 1–24; 
Kevin DeLapp, ‘Moral Perception and Moral Realism’, in Moral Perception, ed. J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 43–63; Timothy Chappell, ‘Moral Perception’, Philosophy 83, no. 326 (2008): 421–
37, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819108000818; Nigel Pleasants, ‘Institutional Wrongdoing and Moral Perception’, 
Journal of Social Philosophy 39, no. 1 (2008): 96–115, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00413.x; Justin P. 
McBrayer, ‘A Limited Defense of Moral Perception’, Philosophical Studies 149 (2010): 305–20, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/40783267; Justin P. McBrayer, ‘Moral Perception and the Causal Objection’, Ratio 23, no. 3 (21 
July 2010): 291–307, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00468.x; Andrew Cullison, ‘Moral Perception’, European 
Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2010): 159–75, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0378.2009.00343.x; Jonathan Dancy, ‘Moral 
Perception’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes 84 (2010): 99–117; Carla Bagnoli, ‘Moral Perception 
and Knowledge by Principles’, in The New Intuitionism, ed. Jill Hernandez (London: Continuum, 2011), 84–105; Robert 
Audi, Moral Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jennifer Church, Possibilities of Perception (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Robert Cowan, ‘Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 
6, no. 4 (2015): 665–82, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-014-0185-4; Robert Cowan, ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90, no. 1 (2015): 164–93, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12023; J. Jeremy 
Wisnewski, ‘The Case for Moral Perception’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14, no. 1 (2015): 129–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-013-9321-3; Benjamin De Mesel, ‘Seeing Color, Seeing Emotion, Seeing Moral Value’, 
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On the other, we have 
Emotional Intuitionism: Moral experiences consist of emotions.4 
If we pursue the idea that there are such things as moral experiences, is it more plausible that they 
consist of perceptions or emotions? 
I’ll argue that moral experiences consist of emotions. In the most compelling putative cases, 
emotions are present. If we modify the case so the emotion is absent, the moral experience 
disappears. If we modify it so the emotion is present, but perceptual experiences of the subject 
matter are absent, the moral experience is present. These three observations are best explained by 
the hypothesis that moral experiences are emotions. In response, one might point to cases in which 
 
Journal of Value Inquiry 50, no. 3 (2016): 539–55, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-015-9535-4; Preston J. Werner, ‘Moral 
Perception and the Contents of Experience’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 13, no. 3 (2016): 294–317, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681063; Preston J. Werner, ‘A Posteriori Ethical Intuitionism and the Problem of 
Cognitive Penetrability’, European Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 4 (2017): 1791–1809, https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12272; 
Preston J. Werner, ‘Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, no. 2 (2018): 164–
81, https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810075; Preston J. Werner, ‘Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for 
Perceptual Awareness?’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (2020): 290–319, https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20182801. 
4 See Mark Johnston, ‘The Authority of Affect’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 1 (2001): 181–214, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00097.x; Daniel Jacobson, ‘Seeing by Feeling: Virtues, Skills, and Moral 
Perception’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8, no. 4 (2005): 387–409, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-8837-1; 
Terence Cuneo, ‘Signs of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feelings in Moral Judgement’, British Journal for the History 
of Philosophy 14, no. 1 (2006): 69–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/09608780500449164; Sabine Döring, ‘Seeing What to Do: 
Affective Perception and Rational Motivation’, Dialectica 61 (2007): 363–94; Sabine Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Antti Kauppinen, ‘A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition’, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 43, no. 3 (2013): 360–81; Jonathan Dancy, ‘Intuition and Emotion’, Ethics 124, no. 4 (2014): 787–812, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/675879; Adam Pelser, ‘Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification’, in 
Emotion and Value, ed. Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 107–23; Rafe McGregor, 
‘Making Sense of Moral Perception’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18, no. 4 (2015): 745–58, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-015-9601-9; Wisnewski, ‘The Case for Moral Perception’; Robert Cowan, ‘Epistemic 
Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 1 (2016): 59–81; Robert Cowan, 
‘Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness’, in Evaluative Perception, ed. Anna Bergqvist and 
Robert Cowan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 219–36, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0012; Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values, and Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016); Michael Milona, ‘Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously’, Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice 19, no. 4 (2016): 897–915, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9716-7; Michael Milona, ‘Intellect versus Affect: 
Finding Leverage in an Old Debate’, Philosophical Studies 174, no. 9 (2017): 2251–76, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-
016-0797-x; Jonathan Mitchell, ‘The Epistemology of Emotional Experience’, Dialectica 71, no. 1 (2017): 57–84; Michael 
Milona and Hichem Naar, ‘Sentimental Perceptualism and the Challenge from Cognitive Bases’, Philosophical Studies 177, 
no. 10 (2020): 3071–96, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01360-7. As I’ll understand the view, the Emotional 
Intuitionist needn’t claim that all emotions constitute moral experiences, only that all moral experiences are constituted 
by emotions. Determining which types of emotion are involved in moral judgments is an instance of the thorny problem 
of demarcating morality from other areas of normativity and evaluation. I’ll leave this open and will simply take it that a 
wide range of emotions relating to interpersonal relationships, the flourishing of living beings, etc. are sufficiently 
“ethical” to be good candidates for moral experiences. For relevant discussion, see Jesse Prinz, ‘The Moral Emotions’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 519–37, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199235018.003.0024. 
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an agent feels no emotion and yet appears able to discern moral matters a posteriori. I’ll argue that 
there are several viable routes for explaining away such cases. Finally, I’ll deal with what I suspect is 
an important source of resistance to Emotional Intuitionism: the suspicion that emotions are an 
inadequate basis for moral beliefs, and hence that Emotional Intuitionism cannot vindicate moral 
knowledge. To allay this worry, I’ll outline promising solutions to the main objections to emotion-
based knowledge. 
One complication: some have tried to dissolve the dispute between Perceptual and 
Emotional Intuitionism by appealing to what’s known as “strong perceptualism” in the philosophy 
of emotion, the view that emotions are themselves a kind of perception.5 Even if one adopts this 
theory, it remains an interesting question whether moral experiences consist of emotions or of non-
emotional perceptions. In what follows, I’ll speak as if emotions are not perceptions, but the reader 
can interpret this in a manner compatible with strong perceptualism if desired.6 More generally, I’ll 
remain as neutral as possible on the question of what emotions are. Instead of appealing to a 
determinate theory of emotion, I’ll draw on phenomena which everyone should be able to 
recognize.7 
I proceed as follows. Section 2 considers the most compelling putative cases of moral 
experience and argues that Emotional Intuitionism provides a better explanation of the phenomena 
than Perceptual Intuitionism does. Section 3 argues against other possible forms of moral 
empiricism. Section 4 deals with the problem of putatively emotionless moral experiences. Section 5 
responds to worries about the possibility of emotion-based knowledge. Section 6 summarizes the 
article’s ramifications. 
2. Three Observations about Moral Experience 
How might one defend the claim that there is such a thing as moral experience? A natural maneuver 
is to point to cases in which an agent forms a non-inferential moral belief that doesn’t seem to be 
founded on reason. In this section I’ll argue that, when we attend properly to the most compelling 
putative cases of moral experience, it becomes highly plausible that these experiences consist of 
emotions. In Section 2.1, I make three observations about moral experience; in Section 2.2, I argue 
that these are best explained by Emotional Intuitionism.  
 
5 See Wisnewski, ‘The Case for Moral Perception’. Strong perceptualism is defended by Tappolet. Tappolet, Emotions, 
Values, and Agency. 
6 For what it’s worth, I think the marked differences between emotion and canonical forms of perception render strong 
perceptualism implausible. See, e.g., Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction 
(London: Routledge, 2012), 67–71. But this doesn’t matter for the present article.  
7 The one exception to this neutrality is that I’ll assume the falsity of ‘judgmentalism’, the view that emotions are beliefs, 
defended by Robert Solomon, The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993); Martha 
Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). The possibility of recalcitrant emotions 
renders it implausible that emotions involve beliefs. See Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, ‘The Significance of 
Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52 (2003): 127–45, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007931. Judgmentalists should be able to endorse an analogue of Emotional 
Intuitionism, according to which non-inferential a posteriori moral beliefs are emotions, but it would overcomplicate 
matters for me to set things up in a way that makes room for this. 
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2.1 Three Observations 
Let’s begin with a case offered by Richard Werner, which played a key role in the revival8 of moral 
empiricism in recent decades: 
Suppose that Fred has carefully read and considered the utilitarian literature and finds that 
utilitarianism conforms completely with his moral sensibilities and psychological set. He has thought 
about some of the problems the recent literature has indicated […], such as [utilitarianism’s] apparent 
support of slavery in some contexts, but has decided that such problems can be adequately solved. 
[…] Fred thinks that in most actual social contexts slavery cannot be justified. In the few cases where 
it can be justified, […] slavery is justified because of the evils avoided and the goods achieved. 
Achieving those goods or avoiding those evils would be done at considerable cost, but Fred believes 
that the result would make the cost worth bearing. […] However, […] while watching “Roots” on his 
TV, Fred decides to give up utilitarianism. He proclaims, “The fact that slavery is obviously morally 
wrong and that it follows from my version of utilitarianism, shows that my version of utilitarianism is 
disconfirmed as a legitimate moral theory.”9 
An advantage of this case is that it seems true to life. As Werner puts it, “anyone […] who has 
taught introductory ethics” will have “observed such experiences in others” and experienced them 
first-hand.10 Hence, it would be a significant theoretical cost if one had to deny that cases like Fred’s 
are possible or claim that such individuals cannot have been sincerely committed to utilitarianism to 
begin with. 
Crucially, this case is difficult for moral rationalists to accommodate. It’s implausible that 
Fred’s change of outlook results from inference; he isn’t figuring out the implications of his existing 
beliefs but changing his mind.11 It’s also unlikely that Fred’s new belief is based on rational intuition. 
 
8 Historical precedents for moral empiricism arguably include Aristotle, the British Moral Sense theorists, and several of 
the Phenomenologists. See Jessica Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Lilli 
Alanen, ‘Emotions in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century’, in Sourcebook for the History of the Philosophy of Mind, ed. 
Simo Knuuttila and Juha Sihvola (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 499–533; Michelle Montague, ‘A Contemporary View of 
Brentano’s Theory of Emotion’, The Monist 100, no. 1 (2017): 64–87; Peter Poellner, ‘Phenomenology and the Perceptual 
Model of Emotion’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 141, no. 3 (2016): 261–88; David Weberman, ‘Heidegger and the 
Disclosive Character of the Emotions’, Southern Journal of Philosophy 34, no. 3 (1996): 379–410, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1996.tb00798.x. Forerunners within analytic philosophy include Murdoch, Wiggins 
and McDowell. Iris Murdoch, ‘Vision and Choice in Morality’, Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, Supplementary Volumes 30 
(1956): 32–58; Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); David Wiggins, ‘Truth, 
Invention, and the Meaning of Life’, Proceedings of the British Academy 62 (1977): 331–78; John McDowell, ‘Aesthetic Value, 
Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World’, in Pleasure, Preference, and Value, ed. Eva Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 1–16. 
9 Werner, ‘Ethical Realism’, 657–59. 
10 Ibid., 659.  
11 Admittedly, an inference can lead you to reject your initial premises if you reason through a reductio ad absurdum. But 
Fred had already worked out a coherent stance on slavery and was familiar with his principles’ implications, so it isn’t 
plausible that this is happening here. Clinging to the idea that “moral observation” is always a matter of inference, 
Nicholas Sturgeon defends the claim that Fred must have unconsciously endorsed anti-utilitarian principles while 
consciously endorsing utilitarian ones, and that his change of view is really the working out of this contradiction. See 
Nicholas Sturgeon, ‘Ethical Intuitionism and Ethical Naturalism’, in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, ed. Philip Stratton-
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He had already thought carefully about the moral structure of slavery and its relation to a range of 
possible moral principles, so it’s psychologically implausible that watching “Roots” simply jogs him 
into recognizing an abstract principle that escaped him before. Instead, there’s reason to think that 
something happens inside Fred which couldn’t have happened without this vivid, concrete (though 
fictional)12 encounter with the institution of slavery. There is strong pressure to think that Fred’s 
encounter with “Roots” gives him something he couldn’t have gotten independently of this lived 
experience—to think that his new beliefs depend on moral experience rather than reason. 
Let’s therefore accept the tempting suggestion that Fred undergoes a moral experience. 
What kind of mental state does this experience consist of? I’ll argue that (1) a typical agent in Fred’s 
position would experience a range of emotions; (2) if we modify the case so the agent doesn’t feel 
these emotions, the moral experience disappears; and (3) if we modify it so the emotions are present, 
but perceptual experiences of slavery are absent, the moral experience is nonetheless present. (Later, 
I’ll argue that Emotional Intuitionism offers the best explanation of these observations.) 
(1) Firstly, we’re bound to imagine Fred feeling a range of emotions. “Roots” (a 1977 TV 
series) attracted huge audiences due to its dramatic, moving portrayal of slavery. It was full of racial 
and sexual violence, with “coarse, wicked [W]hites inflict[ing] cruelty, from rape to maiming, upon 
peaceable, vulnerable, sensitive [B]lacks”.13 Fred must have been squirming in his seat, looking on in 
horror and anguish, perhaps shedding tears. Beyond shock value, contemporary reviews praised 
“Roots” for offering an emotionally complex viewing experience. The show 
made it possible for most [W]hite and [B]lack Americans to sit down as a people and hear the story 
of slavery with something more than guilt, on the one hand, or shame and anger, on the other. 
By coaxing White and Black viewers alike to identify with the Black protagonists, the show evoked 
something like a sense of “triumph” at the “slavery-and-freedom” story, “some collective measure 
of release and even pride in the way that [W]hites and [B]lacks are finally dealing with […] ‘our 
greatest national disgrace.’” In short, what made “Roots” remarkable was the emotional engagement 
with slavery it provoked. Because we’re told that Fred has thought about the consequences of 
slavery before, we naturally imagine that “Roots” made a difference for him because it engaged his 
emotions. Arguably, this already strongly suggests that Fred’s emotional reaction is the experience 
moral empiricists are looking for. For the moment, let’s simply observe that his moral experience 
coincides with an emotional reaction. 
 
Lake (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 205–6. But it seems needlessly uncharitable to accuse Fred—and anyone 
else who ever abandons one ethical view for another—of having initially held contradictory beliefs. As we’ll see, other 
interpretations are available. 
12 If the reader thinks it makes a difference that what Fred sees is televisual or fictional, they are welcome to consider 
Fred as an 18th century Benthamite who witnesses slavery first-hand instead. 
13 All quotations in this paragraph are from reviews in The Washington Post from when “Roots” was first broadcast, 
reprinted in an article by Bethonie Butler. Bethonie Butler, ‘Everyone Was Talking about “Roots” in 1977 -- Including 
Ronald Reagan’, The Washington Post, 30 May 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-
entertainment/wp/2016/05/30/everyone-was-talking-about-roots-in-1977-including-ronald-reagan/. I’ve slightly 
bowdlerized the racial terminology to fit current usage. 
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(2) Let’s modify the case by imagining an agent who watches the same show but feels no 
emotion.14 This will lead to a second observation which I will argue is grist to the Emotional 
Intuitionist’s mill. To find a plausible scenario in which someone could watch these scenes of 
mutilation and rape without experiencing emotion, we need to imagine a person who lacks the 
emotional capacities of typical agents.15 For this purpose, let’s imagine Barney, who shares Fred’s 
initial moral beliefs, but who is an emotionally empathic dysfunctional individual (EEDI).16 This 
means that Barney lacks emotional empathy, i.e. the normal ability to feel “an emotional response to 
another individual that is congruent with the other’s emotional reaction”, but has a “fully 
functioning theory of mind”.17 So let’s imagine that Barney sits through “Roots”, perceiving all of 
the events and understanding the motivations and experiences of the characters, but that he feels 
nothing. 
When we modify the case in this way, we lose any motivation for thinking that a moral 
experience occurs. Our initial motivation for thinking this was that Fred formed a new moral belief 
that wasn’t founded on reason. From what we know about EEDIs, it’s highly unlikely that Barney 
would form a similar belief in reaction to “Roots”. Empirical evidence indicates that people with this 
deficit “struggle with forming authority independent moral judgments unless they have rules to 
apply.”18 Typically, people like Barney make moral judgments by applying explicit rules they have 
learned and by using enlightened self-interest (e.g., to avoid penalties and maintain the esteem of 
others). But there is no reason to think an agent like Barney would form new beliefs conflicting with 
his initial principles. This removes the motivation for thinking that Barney undergoes a moral 
experience. Of course, watching “Roots” might give Barney new insight into the non-moral facts of 
slavery, particularly the inner lives of enslaved people. Coupled with his existing moral principles, 
this might even lead him to draw some new moral conclusions, e.g., regarding the ethics of 
 
14 Similar modifications are used for different purposes by Preston Werner (not to be confused with Richard Werner, 
who proposed the initial Fred case) and Pekka Väyrynen. Werner, ‘Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience’; 
Pekka Väyrynen, ‘Doubts about Moral Perception’, in Evaluative Perception, ed. Anna Bergqvist and Robert Cowan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 109–28, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198786054.003.0006. 
15 Am I right to consider the “extreme” case of an agent who has no emotional response to “Roots”, rather than an 
agent who simply has a different emotional response (e.g., a White supremacist who approves of what he is seeing)? This 
depends on nuanced issues about the semantics of counterfactuals. But compare the counterfactual, “If a rock hadn’t hit 
the window, it wouldn’t have broken.” Intuitively, the right way to evaluate this is to consider what happens if nothing 
hits the window, rather than if something else (e.g., a boot) hits it. (Compare David Lewis, ‘Causation as Influence’, The 
Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 4 (2000): 190, https://doi.org/10.2307/2678389; Karen Bennett, ‘Why the Exclusion 
Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It’, Noûs 3 (2003): 482.) The former seems analogous to 
considering an EEDI’s lack of emotional reaction; the latter seems analogous to considering a White supremacist’s 
different reaction. 
16 I borrow this term from Preston Werner, who coins it to sidestep theoretical controversies surrounding the term 
“psychopath”. Werner, ‘Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience’, 301–2. 
17 Werner, 301; compare Robert Blair, ‘Empathic Dysfunction in Psychopathic Individuals’, in Empathy in Mental Illness, 
ed. Tom Farrow and Peter Woodruff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511543753.002. 
18 Werner, ‘Moral Perception and the Contents of Experience’, 303; see also Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (New 
York: Putnam, 1994), 34–51; Robert Blair, Derek Mitchell, and Karina Blair, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 47–80. 
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reparations. But none of this suggests a moral experience, as opposed to a run-of-the-mill non-moral 
experience. So, here is our second observation: if we modify the case so that emotions are absent, 
the moral experience disappears. 
(3) To make our third observation, let’s imagine one more variation, this time with the 
emotion present but with all relevant perceptual states removed. Consider Wilma, who starts with 
the same initial beliefs as Fred and has a typical range of emotional capacities. Instead of watching 
the “Roots” miniseries, Wilma reads Roots: The Saga of an American Family, the novel on which the TV 
show was based.19 Let’s imagine that the novel has as profound an impact on Wilma as the series did 
on Fred and that she too forms the belief that slavery is wrong in all circumstances. 
To my mind, Wilma seems no less realistic than Fred.20 Since the cases are parallel, there’s 
just as much reason to ascribe a moral experience to Wilma as there was with Fred. Likewise, we 
naturally imagine Wilma experiencing a range of emotions like those experienced by Fred: horror, 
anguish, sorrow at the brutality; triumph and hope at the redemptive ending. The interesting thing 
for our purposes is that Wilma doesn’t see, hear, or otherwise perceive the phenomena her moral 
experience is about. Regarding Fred, the Perceptual Intuitionist will want to say that he had sense-
perceptions of slavery while watching “Roots”. One might object to this on the grounds that Fred is 
perceiving a TV show rather than slavery itself; but, as noted above, we could easily make Fred an 
18th century Benthamite who witnesses slavery first-hand. Let’s therefore grant that Fred can see and 
hear the manifestations of slavery that were the objects of his moral experience. The same cannot be 
said for Wilma. What Wilma sees are words on the page. She doesn’t see or hear the novel’s events 
but imagines them. Therefore, even if we’re open to the idea that sense-perception sometimes has 
moral contents, we should observe that Wilma has a moral experience despite lacking any sense-
perceptions of the relevant subject-matter. This is our third observation: if we modify the case so 
that emotion is present, but perceptual experiences of the subject matter are absent, the moral 
experience is present. 
Before considering how best to explain these three observations, let me show that they 
aren’t incidental to Fred’s case, but hold in other paradigmatic cases of moral experience. First, 
Suppose Pius is convinced of the wrongness of extra-marital sexual relations. As a result he 
condemns all cases of two people who are not married to each other living together. Now suppose 
that a couple come to live next door to him whom he gets to know and greatly admire. After he has 
known them for some time it transpires that they are not married because one of them cannot obtain 
a divorce from a previous unhappy marriage. It may be that Pius finds himself unable to view their 
relationship as morally unacceptable and so rejects his previous blanket censoriousness about extra-
marital relationships.21 
 
19 Alex Haley, Roots: The Saga of an American Family (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976). 
20 Compare, for instance, Will Kaufman’s account of the reception of literary slave narratives in 19th c. America. Will 
Kaufman, The Civil War in American Culture (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 16–20. 
21 McNaughton, Moral Vision, 102; echoed by McGrath, ‘Moral Knowledge by Perception’, 224–25. 
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The reasons for crediting Pius with moral experience are much the same as they were in the previous 
case: his new moral judgments conflict with his former principles, so they seem unlikely to be 
produced by reason. 
Now for our observations. (1) It’s highly plausible that emotion is present. We’re told that 
Pius feels “great admiration” for the couple, and we naturally imagine the warmth of friendship, the 
delight of pleasant company and feelings of mutual respect. Because of these bonds, it’s hard to 
imagine that Pius is unmoved when the conflict between his principles and his friendship emerges. 
(2) If we modify the case so that these emotions are absent, it ceases to be plausible that a moral 
experience occurs. Imagine Benedict, who shares Pius’s initial condemnation of extra-marital sex. 
Imagine that a couple come to live next door to Benedict, but that, although they seem OK to him, 
no emotional bond develops. Now imagine Benedict hears that the couple aren’t married. I see no 
psychological reason for thinking that Benedict would “find himself unable to view their relationship 
as morally unacceptable”. Instead, it seems plausible that his initial moral views would stay firm and 
that he would judge the couple to be living in sin. This removes any reason for thinking that 
Benedict has undergone a moral experience. (3) Let’s modify the initial case so that our agent 
experiences emotion without directly perceiving the situation. Imagine that Pius’s neighbors are 
shut-ins whom he never meets face-to-face. But imagine they begin exchanging letters, and that a 
bond of friendship develops through written means that is just as strong as in the initial case. I 
submit that, so long as we imagine Pius experiencing the same emotions towards the couple, the lack 
of sense-perceptions of their relationship makes no difference. If he has the relevant emotions 
despite lacking any sense-perceptions of their relationship, the moral experience is present. 
Finally, let’s consider the most prominent example in discussions of moral experience, 
Gilbert Harman’s case in which “you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour 
gasoline on a cat and ignite it.”22 In a flash, the judgment that this is wrong pops into your head. This 
case doesn’t pose problems for the rationalist in the same way as the previous two, as nothing about 
it rules out rational intuition or speedy inference from existing principles. Still, one viable 
explanation is that your belief results from a moral experience (rather than a non-moral experience 
plus the application of a moral principle). Let’s pursue the suggestion that this is a case of moral 
experience and explore how it relates to emotion and perception. 
(1) It’s obvious that a typical agent witnessing the cat-burning will have an emotional 
reaction, probably some mixture of disgust, revulsion, horror, dismay, etc. (2) If we take away these 
emotions, it becomes implausible that a moral experience occurs. As with Barney, there’s reason to 
think that an EEDI’s judgments about the cat-burning would be exhausted by reasoning from 
existing principles, thus removing any motivation for thinking they undergo a moral experience. This 
borne out by the fact that some EEDIs appear able to inflict pain on animals without being struck 
by the intuitive judgment that what they are doing is wrong.23 We find a phenomenologically rich 
illustration of this in a passage from Iain Banks’s The Wasp Factory, in which the protagonist sets fire 
 
22 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 4. 
23 See Blair, Mitchell, and Blair, The Psychopath, 1–3. It bears emphasizing that EEDIs can know that harming animals is 
wrong by other means, e.g., reasoning, testimony; not all EEDIs fit the cultural stereotype of the “psychopath.” 
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to a family of rabbits.24 Frank, the protagonist, seems to be an EEDI, and the rabbit-burning passage 
is particularly horrifying because the first-person narration is so detailed and yet so devoid of 
emotion. Correlatively, Frank certainly doesn’t experience what he is doing as wrong. Heading out to 
the “Rabbit Grounds” is just another of the rituals with which he fills his time. Therefore, Banks’s 
portrayal—which rings true psychologically and fits the empirical evidence—supports the claim that 
in the absence of emotion the moral experience is absent too.25 (3) What if, instead of seeing the cat-
burning, you read a description of it which is vivid enough to elicit a similar range of emotions as 
those present in the initial cat-burning case? (The reader could experiment by reading the passage 
from The Wasp Factory just mentioned.) In this variation, you can’t see or hear (or smell) the event, 
yet the reasons for positing a moral experience seem as strong as they were in the initial case. So 
again, when we modify the case so that sense-perceptions of the event are absent and emotions are 
present, the moral experience still seems to be present. 
Let’s take stock. In all three examples,26 we’ve observed the same three facts: 
(1) The moral experience coincides with an emotional reaction. 
(2) If we modify the case so that the emotions are absent, the moral experience disappears. 
(3) If we modify the case so that emotions are present, but perceptions of the subject matter 
are absent, the moral experience is nonetheless present. 
Intuitively, my sense is that these three facts speak in favor of Emotional Intuitionism. But to be 
thorough, let’s compare the respective explanations of (1)–(3) that Emotional Intuitionists and 
Perceptual Intuitionists can offer. (I’ll argue that the former really do have the upper hand.) 
2.2 Explaining the Observations 
According to Emotional Intuitionism moral experiences consist of emotions. This neatly explains 
why the moral experience is present in just those variations in which emotions are present. In doing 
so, it straightforwardly accounts for (1)–(3). 
Might it be possible to give an alternative explanation of (1)–(3) that’s compatible with 
Perceptual Intuitionism? Here is my best attempt. The Perceptual Intuitionist should hypothesize 
that moral perceptions depend causally on emotion.27 In this way, they can explain the first two 
observations as follows. In the initial version of each case, the scene produces non-moral 
perceptions, which cause an emotional response, which in turn causes a perception with moral 
 
24 Iain Banks, The Wasp Factory (London: Macmillan, 1984), chap. 2. 
25 Preston Werner offers a different argument for this claim. Werner, ‘Moral Perception and the Contents of 
Experience’. 
26 Several more rich examples of experiences which lead agents to change their moral outlooks are to be found in 
Michael DePaul, Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1993).  DePaul 
declines to give a characterization of the mental states involved in these “formative experiences” and expresses some 
doubt that they all involve emotion (ibid., pp. 144–7). However, though I lack space to discuss each of his cases here, 
I’m confident that Emotional Intuitionism can account for all of them. 
27 See Cowan, ‘Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception’; Cowan, ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’; Werner, ‘Moral 
Perception and the Contents of Experience’. 
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content, thus explaining (1) the co-occurrence of emotion and moral experience. In the second 
variation of each case, the scene produces non-moral perceptions, but these fail to cause an 
emotional response and therefore no moral perceptions result. This explains (2) the lack of moral 
experience in the absence of emotion. The third variation could be explained as follows: the text 
produces non-moral comprehension and imagination of the situation, which causes an emotional 
response, which causes a moral perception of the situation. As we’ll discuss in a moment, this 
suggestion is troublesome for various reasons, but if it can be made workable then the Perceptual 
Intuitionist has an explanation of (3) why a moral experience occurs when emotion is present, and 
sense-perception of the subject matter is absent. 
Which explanation is superior? The Emotional Intuitionist has the upper hand on three 
counts: simplicity, redundancy, and plausibility. 
Simplicity. The Emotional Intuitionist evidently offers the simpler explanation. Both 
explanations appeal to emotions, but the Perceptual Intuitionist appeals to an additional causal 
mechanism through which the emotion produces a moral perception. All else equal, we should 
prefer the simpler explanation.  
Redundancy. Not only is the Perceptual Intuitionist forced to posit an extra causal mechanism; 
they seem to be positing a redundant one. An emotion is already a non-doxastic state which 
represents its object as exhibiting a certain evaluative property.28 There is good evidence that we 
frequently form evaluative beliefs by consulting our emotions.29 Hence, there doesn’t seem to be any 
explanatory work left for a moral perception to do once an emotion is present. The Perceptual 
Intuitionist falls foul of Occam’s razor, positing a plurality of mental states when only one is 
necessary. 
Plausibility. We ought to prefer the explanation that coheres best with what we already know. 
We already know that morally significant scenes elicit emotional responses, both when we perceive 
them and when we read about them. We already have robust evidence that emotions can influence 
how we form moral beliefs. In contrast, we don’t have any evidence that emotions can produce 
 
28 Philosophers of emotion generally treat it as axiomatic that emotions have evaluative contents. E.g., Jesse Prinz, Gut 
Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), chap. 1; Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An 
Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 2. This is complicated somewhat by 
the ‘attitudinal’ theory of emotion, which locates the evaluative element in the “mode” rather than the “content.” See 
Deonna and Teroni, The Emotions, 76–90. But proponents of the attitudinal view still accept that, representationally 
speaking, emotions are evaluations of their objects. 
29 See Gerald L. Clore and Karen Gasper, ‘Feeling Is Believing: Some Affective Influences on Belief’, in Emotions and 
Beliefs: How Feelings Influence Thoughts, ed. Nico H Frijda, A S R Manstead, and S Bemet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 10–44; Jonathan Haidt, ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment’, Psychological Review 108, no. 4 (2001): 814–34, https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814; Joshua D. 
Greene et al., ‘An FMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment’, Science 293, no. 5537 (2001): 
2105–8, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1062872; Paul Slovic et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic’, European Journal of Operational 
Research 177, no. 3 (2007): 1333–52, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2005.04.006. For criticism, see Bryce Huebner, Susan 
Dwyer, and Marc Hauser, ‘The Role of Emotion in Moral Psychology’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13, no. 1 (2009): 1–6, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.09.006. 
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perceptions with moral contents.30 So, in addition to being complicated and redundant, the 
Perceptual Intuitionist’s explanation is at best highly speculative. However, the disparity in 
plausibility comes out most strongly with respect to observation (3). In the third variation of each 
case, the agent has no sense-perceptions of the subject matter, so it’s unclear what it means to claim 
that he or she is literally having a moral perception of it. The Perceptual Intuitionist owes us an 
account of how this works and why it still counts as perception in the relevant sense. Worse still, 
theories of “high-level” perception often claim that there must be a framework of “low-level” 
properties like shape and color, to which “high-level” properties are added.31 It doesn’t seem 
plausible that one could perceive something as a pine tree without seeing its shape, color, etc. 
Similarly, it doesn’t seem plausible that one could perceive an action as wrong without seeing or 
hearing what the agent is doing, at least in any non-metaphorical sense of “perceive”. 
In response, the Perceptual Intuitionist might propose that moral perception happens “in 
the mind’s eye” in these cases.32 Perhaps the agent perceptually imagines the low-level properties, 
which leads her to perceptually imagine the moral properties? I’ll discuss this rejoinder in some 
depth and argue that it faces its own problems of plausibility. 
As an initial cost, it seems highly speculative to claim that we have a capacity for imaginings 
with moral contents. I’m unaware of anyone who has explicitly defended the existence of such a 
capacity. However, let me fill this gap by sketching what I think is the most plausible account 
available to the Perceptual Intuitionist. Jennifer Church holds that moral perception itself involves 
imagining non-actual scenarios, so her account provides a promising starting point for defending the 
idea of imaginings with moral contents.33 According to Church, agents perceive moral properties by 
imagining different ways of proceeding from the current situation, under constraints provided by the 
moral principles they believe. If an agent finds that all “morally possible” ways of proceeding involve 
a certain action-type, this amounts to perceiving the action-type as obligatory.34 To make room for 
moral imaginings, we simply need to allow the initial scenario to be imagined rather than perceived. 
This yields an account of how imaginings could present actions as right or wrong. 
However, the Perceptual Intuitionist runs into trouble even if she posits a capacity along 
these lines. On Church’s account, the space of what imagination can reveal as morally right or wrong 
is fixed by one’s existing moral beliefs. As such, the account can’t accommodate cases where the 
agent changes her moral outlook. Consider again Wilma, our utilitarian who reads Roots. Her 
 
30 Firestone and Scholl offer a damning assessment of the empirical evidence for moral perception. They rightly point 
out that, so far, experiments have failed to distinguish between (i) attentional effects versus differences in perceptual 
content and (ii) perception of morally significant objects versus perception of objects as morally significant. Chaz 
Firestone and Brian J. Scholl, ‘“Moral Perception” Reflects Neither Morality Nor Perception’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
20, no. 2 (2016): 75–76, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.006. 
31 See, e.g., Christopher Peacocke, ‘Précis of A Study of Concepts’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56, no. 2 (1996): 
407–11. Cowan argues on phenomenological grounds that moral perception would require moral contents to be added 
to a framework of low-level properties. Cowan, ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’, 168–75; see also David Faraci, ‘A Hard Look 
at Moral Perception’, Philosophical Studies 172, no. 8 (2015): 2055–72, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0397-6. 
32 Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this. 
33 Church, Possibilities of Perception. 
34 It might be fruitful to compare this with the phenomenon of “imaginative resistance.” See Richard Moran, ‘The 
Expression of Feeling in Imagination’, The Philosophical Review 103, no. 1 (1994): 75, https://doi.org/10.2307/2185873. 
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antecedent moral beliefs leave room for certain ways of proceeding that don’t involve abolishing 
slavery. For instance, she can imagine a (to her mind) “morally possible” world in which slaves are 
given drugs that neutralize their physical and emotional pain, while their labor is used to bring about 
significant societal benefits. Since Wilma’s imagination would present scenarios like this as viable 
ways of proceeding, it wouldn’t present slavery as inherently wrong. The account I’ve outlined still 
can’t explain the characteristics of Wilma’s moral experience. 
This reveals a more general problem. To show that the rejoinder is viable, the Perceptual 
Intuitionist needs to explain how the moral contents of imaginings take shape. The foregoing shows 
that they can’t do so by appealing to the agent’s existing moral beliefs. Another route might be to 
appeal to past experience. Maybe the agent just needs to have perceived similar cases as wrong in the 
past in order to imagine this case as wrong? However, this would entail that Roots can only have its 
effect on Wilma if she’s previously witnessed similar deeds and perceived them as wrong, which isn’t 
plausible. Surely, part of fiction’s power to transform our moral outlooks lies in its ability to present 
us with scenarios we haven’t perceived in real life. But then, the Perceptual Intuitionist can’t appeal 
to past experience to explain the (alleged) moral contents of Wilma’s imaginings. I can’t see any 
other promising way to proceed; I therefore submit that the rejoinder has turned out to be a dead 
end. Pending an account of moral imagining that can explain changes in outlook, the Perceptual 
Intuitionist’s best attempt to explain observation (3) looks implausible. Meanwhile, the Emotional 
Intuitionist simply appeals to the manifest fact that we respond emotionally to texts. 
Let’s take stock. To explain observations (1) and (2), Perceptual Intuitionists must 
hypothesize that moral perception is causally mediated by emotion, but the resulting account looks 
complicated and redundant in comparison with Emotional Intuitionism, as well as more speculative. 
Regarding observation (3), the Perceptual Intuitionist must either posit genuine moral perception in 
the absence of sense-perception or posit imaginings with moral contents which conflict with the 
agent’s prior views. On examination, both options seem implausible, and certainly far less plausible 
than the familiar facts on which Emotional Intuitionism draws. I conclude that Emotional 
Intuitionism gives by far the better explanation of observations (1)–(3). Unless there are strong 
countervailing reasons, those who believe in moral experience should prefer Emotional Intuitionism 
to Perceptual Intuitionism. 
3. Other Forms of Moral Empiricism? 
Emotional Intuitionism is superior to Perceptual Intuitionism, but is it the most promising form of 
moral empiricism? For all I’ve said so far, there might be other forms of moral empiricism that are 
superior.35 In this section, I’ll consider two directions in which one might take the thought that 
moral experience is something other than emotion or moral perception. One option is that there 
exists a distinctive kind of intuition on which moral beliefs are based, which can’t be assimilated to 
either emotion or sense-perception. Another option is that moral experience involves the formation 
of a moral belief on the basis of non-moral perception. I’ll take each in turn. 
 
35 Thanks to both reviewers for urging this worry. 
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3.1 Sui Generis Moral Intuitions 
The first proposal is that we possess sui generis moral intuitions, and that these are non-doxastic states 
on which moral beliefs are based. To assess this proposal, we first need to know what kind of 
mental state it claims these sui generis intuitions are. It turns out that this preliminary question already 
creates problems. The literature on sui generis intuitions is heavily dominated by rationalist accounts. 
Several writers claim that there are non-doxastic moral intuitions, but that these are intellectual states 
in which one grasps a self-evident proposition or an abstract relation among universals.36 My aim in 
this article is to find the most promising form of moral empiricism; on pain of giving up moral 
empiricism altogether, the proponent of sui generis moral intuitions obviously can’t make use of these 
rationalist accounts. It’s beyond the scope of this article to evaluate comprehensively the strengths 
and weaknesses of moral rationalism, but let me quickly note two motivations for sticking with 
empiricism: 
1. As discussed, the cases of Fred and Pius pose problems for rationalism, because the 
abstract principles they find plausible don’t align with their experiential moral 
judgments. 
2. To explain observations (1) and (2), the rationalist seems forced to say that rational 
intuition is mediated by emotion, but then he faces costs in terms of simplicity and 
redundancy (not to mention, we might think, an uphill battle for plausibility). 
What else might moral intuition be if not rational intuition? To my knowledge, the only 
camp endorsing non-doxastic intuitions but rejecting the rationalist orthodoxy is the small faction of 
metaethicists who argue that moral intuitions are emotions.37 This, however, is obviously no 
alternative to Emotional Intuitionism. It therefore looks like no existing account will serve the 
purposes of the proposal under consideration. Pending a novel account of what sui generis intuitions 
are, it’s unclear that there is a third way for moral empiricists here. 
Additionally, even if this hurdle can be cleared, the proposal will incur serious costs in 
explaining our three observations. The proponent of sui generis moral intuitions needs to explain (1) 
the co-occurrence of moral experience and emotion and (2) the disappearance of moral experience 
in the absence of emotion. As with Perceptual Intuitionism, the best available option is to suggest 
 
36 Within metaethics, see Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199259755.001.0001; Robert Audi, The Good in the Right (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004); Michael Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Elijah Chudnoff, ‘Moral 
Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?’, in Phenomenology of Thinking, ed. Thiemo Breyer and 
Christopher Gutland (London: Routledge, 2015), 207–19. Further afield, see Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of 
Perception (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); George Bealer, ‘Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist 
Renaissance’, in Conceivability and Possibility, ed. Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 71–126; Joel Pust, ‘On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity’, Dialectica 58, no. 1 (2004): 71–87; Elijah 
Chudnoff, Intuition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); John Bengson, ‘The Intellectual Given’, Mind 124, no. 495 
(2015): 707–60, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv029. 
37 See Roeser, Moral Emotions and Intuitions; Kauppinen, ‘A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition’; Peter Railton, ‘The 
Affective Dog and Its Rational Tale: Intuition and Attunement’, Ethics 124, no. 4 (2014): 813–59, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/675876; Dancy, ‘Intuition and Emotion’. 
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that sui generis intuitions are causally mediated by emotions; but, once again, this looks complicated 
and redundant in comparison to Emotional Intuitionism. The sui generis view will also inevitably fall 
down on plausibility: Emotional Intuitionism appeals to a mental state that obviously exists; the sui 
generis view asks us to believe in a novel kind of mental state (different even from the intuitions we 
have in math and metaphysics if such things exist). All told, moral empiricists have little reason to 
consider the proposal of sui generis intuitions a serious rival to Emotional Intuitionism. 
3.2 Beliefs Based on Non-Moral Perception 
The remaining proposal is that, in putative cases of moral experience, the agent forms a belief on the 
basis of a perception which doesn’t have any moral content. Some writers use the term “moral 
perception” to refer to this38 or the patterns of non-moral seeing and attending that facilitate it.39 
This conception of moral experience doesn’t posit perception with moral contents; nor does it claim 
that moral beliefs are based on emotion. So, it seems like a genuine alternative. One worry with the 
proposal (let’s call it the doxastic view or DV) is that it fails to provide a satisfying account of how a 
posteriori moral beliefs could be justified. In general, we aren’t entitled to form moral beliefs on the 
basis of non-moral evidence alone. So why think that perceptions without moral contents can 
provide an epistemic basis for moral beliefs?40 This strikes me as a serious worry, but rather than 
pursuing it, let me press a line of objection more closely related to the foregoing. 
Let’s begin by thinking about how DV can make sense of our observations, specifically (1) 
the co-occurrence of moral experience and emotion and (2) the disappearance of moral experience 
in the absence of emotion. Again, the best option seems to be to suggest causal mediation by 
emotion. DV ought to be modified to say that moral experience happens when a non-moral 
perception (or perceptual imagining) gives rise to an emotion, which in turn gives rise to a moral 
belief. 
This modification seems unavoidable, but it threatens to render DV indistinguishable from 
Emotional Intuitionism. With the modification in place, both views agree on the mental states that 
underlie moral experience: each posits a three-step sequence of non-moral perception, emotion, and 
moral judgment. Unless something more can be said to distinguish DV from Emotional 
Intuitionism, it doesn’t look like an alternative at all. 
I see just one way for DV to distinguish itself: by claiming that the belief is based on the 
perception, despite being causally mediated by the emotion. DV is only an alternative if it stipulates 
that the agent’s reason for forming the moral belief is something about the (non-moral) content of 
the perception, with the emotion merely helping the agent to recognize this content. To make this 
stipulation plausible, the proponent of DV could appeal to the fact that emotions draw our attention 
 
38 Cullison, ‘Moral Perception’, 169. Compare Richard Boyd, ‘How to Be a Moral Realist’, in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. 
G. Sayre-McCord (Cornell University Press, 1988), 206–8. 
39 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.30-6111; Lawrence Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Rebecca Kukla, ‘Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception’, 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:sup1 (2002): 319–46, https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2002.10717592. 
40 Compare McGrath, ‘Moral Knowledge by Perception’, 215–18.  
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to potentially significant non-moral facts. For example, when you feel anxious, your attention is 
involuntarily drawn to potential threats.41 The proponent could claim that, although all the relevant 
contents are present in the non-moral perception, emotion plays a crucial role by making the morally 
relevant factors salient. Spelled out in this way, DV offers a coherent account of how emotions 
could play a significant causal role in moral experience even though the resulting belief is based on 
perception. 
I’ll grant that this picture is coherent. But on further consideration it looks inferior to 
Emotional Intuitionism. DV can readily explain cases where experience changes agents minds by 
revealing or making salient non-moral factors they’ve previously ignored. For instance, it can explain 
how witnessing a flood or wildfire changes the moral outlook of an agent who has hitherto 
overlooked the suffering caused by climate breakdown. However, this is not the shape our most 
compelling cases have. Consider again Fred, who has thought carefully about slavery and its relation 
to various principles. Fred is fully aware that slavery causes profound human suffering, but he holds 
that this cost can be outweighed by sufficiently good consequences. Therefore, it isn’t plausible that 
“Roots” changes his mind by revealing some unnoticed non-moral property. Due to his background 
beliefs, attending to all the relevant non-moral features will leave his views just where they are. This 
is precisely why we face pressure to appeal to a state with moral content—an emotion or moral 
perception—to explain his change in outlook. In short, DV seems unable to explain cases where a 
moral experience leads a fully informed agent to change his or her outlook. But this is precisely the 
feature that makes cases like Fred’s such compelling examples of moral experience. Accordingly, this 
constitutes a serious weakness, which renders DV inferior to Emotional Intuitionism. 
4. Objection: Putatively Emotionless Moral Experiences 
I’ve now argued that Emotional Intuitionism is the most promising form of moral empiricism: it is 
the form that’s best able to explain the characteristics of central cases of moral experience. A natural 
response is to look for other cases that fit less well with Emotional Intuitionism. If there are cases of 
moral experience in which the agent lacks any relevant emotional response, this would show that 
Emotional Intuitionism is incorrect (or at least incomplete). This section argues that there are in fact 
several viable routes for accommodating putative cases of emotionless moral experience. 
I haven’t come across any compelling putative cases of emotionless moral experience in the 
literature.42 Most authors focus on the kinds of case discussed above, especially Harman’s cat-
burning example. This means that the Emotional Intuitionist could potentially make the bold move 
of denying that there are emotionless moral experiences, without saying anything more. The burden 
 
41 See Prinz, Gut Reactions, 7–8; Michael S. Brady, Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 20–23. 
42 NB it’s no problem for Emotional Intuitionists that there are cases where emotionless experiences lead agents to 
revise their moral beliefs by revealing previously overlooked non-moral facts. “Roots” probably helped many White 
viewers to put themselves in the shoes of enslaved Africans and Black Americans, and thereby to recognize previously 
overlooked facts about the psychological impact of slavery. This probably led many viewers to draw new moral 
conclusions from their existing moral principles. Arguably, the relevant experiences would have this effect even if they 
were devoid of emotion. However, because the new moral beliefs in these cases are reached inferentially, the experiences 
in question don’t count as moral experiences and pose no threat to Emotional Intuitionism. 
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of proof would be on the critic to produce a problem-case. However, a more dialectically secure 
route is to grant that there are putative cases of emotionless moral experience and try to explain 
them away. So, let’s consider the following case: 
Imagine a teacher, Mr. Jaded, who frequently encounters rudeness in the classroom. Mr. Jaded can 
always tell when a pupil is being rude—you can’t get anything past him. However, Mr. Jaded can’t 
articulate principles that cover the various forms of rudeness he recognizes. If pressed to explain his 
judgments, he says he “knows rudeness when he sees it”. Moreover, Mr. Jaded doesn’t report feeling 
any emotion towards instances of rudeness. In the past he might have got worked up, feeling dislike 
toward insolent students and sometimes getting angry, but after years in the classroom rudeness 
doesn’t faze him anymore. He sends rude pupils to the headteacher without batting an eyelid. 
Agents like Mr. Jaded (assuming for argument’s sake they exist) pose a problem for Emotional 
Intuitionism. Mr. Jaded frequently forms new moral beliefs, e.g., that Sam and Jonny are behaving 
rudely.43 There are grounds for thinking these beliefs are formed a posteriori. He can’t articulate any 
principles that would capture his rudeness-judgments, which suggests that his rudeness-beliefs don’t 
result from inference, because he seemingly lacks premises from which to infer them. It also 
suggests that his insights don’t consist of recognizing new abstract principles, thus telling against the 
hypothesis that he is exercising rational intuition. In short, this looks like a moral experience. But it 
seems doubtful that this moral experience consists of emotion. Mr. Jaded doesn’t express any 
emotion in response to rudeness, nor does he report feeling any. Prima facie, this looks like a case of 
emotionless moral experience. 
I’ll argue that there are at least two attractive ways of upholding Emotional Intuitionism in 
the face of cases like this. The first is to deny that the experience is emotionless, by claiming that Mr. 
Jaded undergoes emotions which are not introspectively accessible (Section 4.1). The second is to 
deny that it is a genuinely moral experience, by claiming that his judgments result from inference 
(Section 4.2). 
4.1 Inaccessible Emotions 
One reply is to claim that cases like Mr. Jaded’s experiences do involve emotion, despite his inability 
to recognize this introspectively. Many theorists think that emotions sometimes occur in the absence 
of introspective recognition. David Hume argued that 
[T]here are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, ’tho they be real passions, produce little 
emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or 
sensation.44 
Hume posits these “calm passions” to account for cases in which an agent exhibits emotion-
reminiscent patterns of motivation while denying that she is undergoing an emotion.45 In Mr. Jaded’s 
 
43 I’m assuming that rudeness is a moral property. The reader is welcome to substitute some other moral property if 
desired. 
44 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (1739; repr., Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1978), 417. 
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case, we might think the best explanation of his motivation to punish rude students—and, indeed, 
his tendency to make non-inferential moral judgments about them—is that he is experiencing subtle 
emotions, while failing to recognize them introspectively. Similar ideas have been defended in recent 
philosophy of emotion, e.g., Patricia Greenspan’s notion of “tamped-down” emotional feelings 
which elude self-ascription and Peter Goldie’s argument that agents can have emotions while lacking 
“reflective consciousness” of them.46 So, this reply to Mr. Jaded’s case doesn’t look like an ad hoc 
defense, but a respectable move with good theoretical pedigree. 
Perhaps most compellingly, emotion scientists have been led to similar conclusions by what 
they’ve observed in the lab. It’s possible to present images to agents in a way that doesn’t reach 
conscious awareness, e.g., by showing the image for ~25 milliseconds (followed by a neutral 
“masking” image). It turns out that showing an emotionally evocative image in this way can produce 
behavior, bodily responses and brain activity matching the emotion which would normally be 
evoked by that image. For example, subliminally showing a spider might produce frowning, 
increased heart-rate and perspiration, and activity in the amygdala.47 What matters most for our 
purposes is that these agents often do not report experiencing any emotional feelings, despite the 
fact that their bodily states and behavior strongly suggest the presence of emotion.48 Nevertheless, 
these inaccessible emotions influence the agents’ judgments of value, e.g. their estimation of how 
much a certain drink is worth.49 Compare Mr. Jaded. He encounters a situation which, under 
different circumstances (e.g., earlier in his career), would have evoked a full-blown, introspectively 
recognizable emotion. He responds to this situation with actions and judgments that are congruent 
with the emotion he would previously have felt. In the light of this laboratory evidence, one 
promising hypothesis is that Mr. Jaded’s actions and judgments are facilitated by subtle emotions 
 
45 This move is defended by Hsueh Qu, ‘Hume’s (Ad Hoc?) Appeal to the Calm Passions’, Archiv Für Geschichte Der 
Philosophie 100, no. 4 (2018): 444–69, https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-4003. Of course, Hume is claiming that all 
motivation stems from the passions. 
46 Patricia Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification (New York: Routledge, 1988), 21–53; 
Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 62–72. As Greenspan 
and Goldie exemplify, you can countenance emotions which elude introspection even if you hold that emotions are 
essentially conscious feelings. To make room for this, you simply need to draw a distinction between a state’s making a 
difference to a subject’s overall phenomenology and its being an object of reflective awareness, a distinction which can 
plausibly be drawn in various ways. 
47 See Joseph E LeDoux, The Emotional Brain (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), chaps 3–7. 
48 See Kent C. Berridge and Piotr Winkielman, ‘What Is an Unconscious Emotion? (The Case for Unconscious 
“Liking”)’, Cognition and Emotion 17, no. 2 (2003): 181–211, https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930302289; Piotr 
Winkielman, Kent C. Berridge, and Julia L. Wilbarger, ‘Unconscious Affective Reactions to Masked Happy versus Angry 
Faces Influence Consumption Behavior and Judgments of Value’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 31, no. 1 (2005): 
121–35, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271309; and some participants in Silke Anders et al., ‘Parietal 
Somatosensory Association Cortex Mediates Affective Blindsight’, Nature Neuroscience 7, no. 4 (2004): 339–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn1213. 
49 Berridge and Winkielman, ‘What Is an Unconscious Emotion?’; Winkielman, Berridge, and Wilbarger, ‘Unconscious 
Affective Reactions’. Other psychologists propose that “unconscious” (i.e. introspectively inaccessible) emotions can 
influence the whole gamut of value-estimations, including moral judgments. See Slovic et al., ‘The Affect Heuristic’; Lisa 
Feldman Barrett and Moshe Bar, ‘See It with Feeling: Affective Predictions during Object Perception’, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364, no. 1521 (2009): 1325–34, https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2008.0312. 
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which elude introspection. If a real-life Mr. Jaded were available, we’d even be able to test this 
hypothesis—we could measure whether he exhibits bodily reactions and brain-activity congruent 
with anger and dislike. If this hypothesis is correct, then cases like Mr. Jaded’s are not really 
emotionless moral experiences. 
In sum, the hypothesis of inaccessible emotions provides an independently plausible, 
philosophically respectable, and empirically supported way to defend Emotional Intuitionism against 
the problem of putatively emotionless moral experiences. 
4.2 Unarticulated Inference 
I’ll now outline an alternative reply to the objection. We’ve said that Mr. Jaded can’t articulate 
principles that cover the various forms of rudeness he recognizes. This is prima facie evidence that his 
judgments of rudeness do not result from inference. Nevertheless, let me offer two hypotheses 
consistent with the case according to which Mr. Jaded’s beliefs do stem from inference. 
Hypothesis 1: Inference from Tacit Beliefs. One possibility is that Mr. Jaded is reasoning from 
principles, despite being unable to articulate them. When we articulate abstract normative principles, 
we are drawing on a non-trivial range of skills. Plausibly, one of the functions of education in 
philosophy (and certain other disciplines) is to equip people with the ability to put forward abstract 
normative principles in an explicit form. (Remember learning how to frame prima facie principles?) 
When someone who hasn’t learnt this skill declines to articulate abstract principles, we shouldn’t 
assume they don’t have general views about all sorts of normative matters. So, in the face of Mr. 
Jaded’s claim that he just “knows rudeness when he sees it,” we might suspect that Mr. Jaded knows 
more than he can tell—that he believes certain principles about rudeness but lacks the ability or 
habitus to state them explicitly. If so, his new beliefs could be inferred from this prior, unarticulated 
knowledge. It therefore seems open for us to claim that Mr. Jaded is relying on a stock of principles 
derived from previous emotional experiences and subsuming new instances under these principles.50 
Hypothesis 2: Analogical Inference. Another possibility is that Mr. Jaded is reasoning in a fashion 
that doesn’t involve subsuming instances under principles. One possibility, which doesn’t seem too 
farfetched, is that he is engaging in analogical inference. Analogical inferences have the form 
x is P. 
x and y are similar in respects relevant to P. 
∴ y is P.51 
Therefore, in order to claim that Mr. Jaded’s beliefs are founded on analogical inference, one must 
claim that for every new instance of rudeness he recognizes, he can point to a previously judged 
instance of rudeness which he believes to be similar in relevant respects. Nothing in the description 
of the case rules this out and, given Mr. Jaded’s long experience, I submit that it is plausible he 
 
50 The same can’t be said for the putative cases of moral experience discussed in Section 2. E.g., Fred is well able to 
articulate the principles he believes and these principles don’t support his new beliefs. 
51 See Paul Bartha, ‘Analogy and Analogical Reasoning’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2019, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-analogy/. 
James Hutton (james.hutton@ed.ac.uk)  Moral Experience 
20 
 
would be able to do so.52 It therefore seems open for the Emotional Intuitionist to claim that Mr. 
Jaded is relying on a background of old emotion-based beliefs about instances of rudeness, coupled 
with an ability to draw analogies (perhaps unconsciously) between new instances and those old 
instances.53 
We now have two hypotheses, neither of which seems implausible, according to which Mr. 
Jaded is inferring rather than having a moral experience. Together with the hypothesis of 
inaccessible emotions, this means there are several viable routes for Emotional Intuitionists to 
accommodate cases like Mr. Jaded’s at little or no theoretical cost, and thereby insist that all 
instances of moral experience involve emotion. 
5. Objection: Emotions Can’t Ground Moral Knowledge 
I’ll now deal briefly with what I suspect is an important source of resistance to Emotional 
Intuitionism: the worry that emotions would be an inadequate basis for moral beliefs and hence that 
Emotional Intuitionism cannot vindicate moral knowledge. It isn’t feasible here to develop a 
positive account of how emotions ground moral knowledge, so my approach will be defensive. I’ll 
identify the main reasons for doubting that emotions can warrant moral beliefs and sketch 
promising lines of response to these doubts. 
So, why might theorists worry that emotions are an inadequate epistemic basis for moral 
beliefs? One probable cause is the folk-epistemological preconception that beliefs based on emotion 
are to be contrasted with beliefs formed through “rationality.” If your schooling was anything like 
mine, you were taught that emotion-based judgments are subjective opinions, and that these are 
antithetical to “facts.”54 In this milieu, it’s unsurprising if many philosophers seeking to vindicate 
moral knowledge are reluctant to accept that our judgments are based on emotion; doing so seems 
like an invitation to skepticism or subjectivism. However, this negative preconception about 
emotion-based beliefs doesn’t provide a good reason for rejecting Emotional Intuitionism. 
Contemporary emotion-theory undermines any simple dichotomy between emotion and rationality,55 
 
52 The supposition that Mr. Jaded has a stock of past rudeness-judgments based on emotion is further supported by the 
suggestion that rudeness is a “historically affective concept”, i.e. one that can only be acquired on the basis of emotion. 
(See Glen Pettigrove and Koji Tanaka, ‘Anger and Moral Judgment’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92, no. 2 [2014]: 
269–86, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2013.795990; Linda Zagzebski, ‘Emotion and Moral Judgment’, Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 66, no. 1 [2003]: 104–24. Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this.) However, I don’t want to 
rely on this suggestion too heavily since there might be other examples that parallel Mr. Jaded without involving 
historically affective concepts. 
53 It’s far less plausible that the putative cases of moral experience discussed in Section 2 can be explained away in the 
same fashion. E.g., Pius has judged previous instances of extramarital sex to be wrong, so analogical reasoning would 
lead him to the same conclusion about the new case. 
54 Alison Jaggar argues that this preconception serves an ideological function, undermining the credibility of women and 
other marginalized groups. Alison M Jaggar, ‘Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology’, Inquiry 32, no. 2 
(1989): 151–76; see also Margaret Olivia Little, ‘Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology’, 
Hypatia 10, no. 3 (1995): 117–37, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1995.tb00740.x. 
55 see, e.g., Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987); Robert H. Frank, Passions 
Within Reason: The Strategic Role of Emotions (New York: Norton, 1988); Richard S Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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and many theorists have defended the claim that emotions play a positive epistemic role. We should 
therefore resist any knee-jerk reaction against the notion of emotion-based knowledge. 
Let’s turn to more sophisticated objections. Remember that my overall goal is to show that 
Emotional Intuitionism is the most promising form of moral empiricism, not to establish it 
conclusively. Hence, my aim here is merely to show that there are promising responses to each 
objection, such that the objections shouldn’t dissuade us from pursuing Emotional Intuitionism. 
5.1 The Common Source Objection 
The Common Source Objection claims that emotions are always grounded in preceding 
representations (“cognitive bases”) and that they can’t warrant belief in any proposition that isn’t 
already warranted by those cognitive bases.56 If this is right, then emotions are incapable of making 
moral knowledge possible. Any belief based on emotion must either already be warranted by the 
emotion’s cognitive bases or not be warranted at all. 
Two complementary lines of response seem viable here. First, it isn’t clear that emotions are 
always mediated by cognitive bases. One kind of counterexample is presented by metaemotions, e.g., 
one’s feeling of disapproval towards one’s own jealousy. Scott Howard argues that “I can simply 
hate my jealousy” without need for “a separate cognitive representation of the latter.”57 Proponents 
of the doctrine of cognitive bases are forced to posit an intervening belief or act of introspection, 
but, Howard argues, this is undermotivated and isn’t phenomenologically plausible for all cases. 
Another potential kind of counterexample is suggested by the neuroscience of emotion. There’s 
evidence of “sub-cortical pathways” that enable us to have emotions that are mediated only by very 
early stages of perceptual processing.58 But ordinary cases of perception are mediated by the very 
same early-stage perceptual processing. So, if we want to uphold the idea that perception is 
immediate (in the relevant sense) then we must deny that the informational states of these early 
processes constitute cognitive bases. But then it follows that the aforementioned emotions are not 
mediated by cognitive bases either.59 If either kind of counterexample is genuine, then the Common 
Source Objection relies on a false assumption about how emotions operate. 
The other line of response questions the objection’s epistemological presuppositions. 
Arguably, even if emotions are mediated by cognitive bases, they might still make an ineliminable 
contribution to a person’s justification. Robert Cowan argues that emotions are “generative sources 
of justification” despite being “epistemically dependent” on their cognitive bases.60 On this view, the 
justification an emotion provides for evaluative beliefs is conditional on the accuracy of its non-
evaluative cognitive bases but isn’t reducible to the justification those cognitive bases could provide 
 
56 See Christopher Peacocke, The Realm of Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 258–69; Deonna and Teroni, 
The Emotions, 121; Pelser, ‘Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification’, 116–21. I adopt Pelser’s 
terminology. 
57 Scott Alexander Howard, ‘Metaemotional Intentionality’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98, no. 3 (2017): 411, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12093. 
58 See LeDoux, The Emotional Brain; Prinz, Gut Reactions, 33–41. 
59 Of course, one might try to rebut the latter class of counterexample in various ways. A fuller exploration must remain 
a task for future research. But while the jury is out, we oughtn’t consider the Common Source Objection fatal. 
60 Cowan, ‘Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness’. 
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on their own. In effect, an emotion involves some evaluative proposition “seeming to be true […] in 
light of the presumed truth” of some non-evaluative information.61 This response seems plausible 
and meshes well with broader views in epistemology. For evidentialists, there’s nothing 
objectionable in the idea that emotions provide novel evidence about what evaluative propositions 
follow from our non-evaluative evidence. Meanwhile, reliabilists can read Cowan as suggesting that 
emotions provide a conditionally reliable way to track the evaluative properties that correlate with 
one’s non-moral information. If Cowan’s picture is right, then the Common Source Objection relies 
on false epistemological assumptions.62 
5.2 The Explanatory Objection 
The Explanatory Objection questions whether emotions could track moral properties, at least if the 
latter are construed as mind-independent and causally inert.63 In response, we can point to the fact 
that the moral properties of an object are determined by its non-moral properties. Plausibly, there 
are patterns of determination, such that certain clusters of non-moral properties predict the presence 
of certain moral properties with a high degree of accuracy.64 If an agent’s emotional disposition 
mirrors these patterns of determination, e.g. by consistently responding to wrong-making properties 
with wrongness-representing emotions, then her emotions will track the moral properties of their 
objects.65 This is only a sketch and it remains a task for further research to spell the response out 
fully. However, I submit that this response looks sufficiently promising for us to be undeterred by 
the Explanatory Objection. 
 
61 Ibid., 230. 
62 Further lines of response to the Common Source Objection are provided by Mitchell, ‘The Epistemology of 
Emotional Experience’; Milona and Naar, ‘Sentimental Perceptualism and the Challenge from Cognitive Bases’. A 
reviewer notes that the objection arises in another form if emotions must always be preceded by cognitive bases with 
evaluative content. (See Kevin Mulligan, ‘On Being Struck by Value’, in Leben Mit Gefühlen: Emotionen, Werte Und Ihre 
Kritik, ed. Barbara Merker [Paderborn: Mentis, 2009], 141–61; Kevin Mulligan, ‘Emotions and Values’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 475–500; Jérôme Dokic and 
Stéphane Lemaire, ‘Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, no. 2 [2013]: 227–27; Jean 
Moritz Müller, ‘How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes’, Dialectica 71, no. 2 [2017]: 281–308, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12192.) But that view is convincingly refuted by Jonathan Mitchell, ‘Pre-Emotional 
Awareness and the Content-Priority View’, The Philosophical Quarterly 69, no. 277 (2019): 771–94, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz018. 
63 See Simon Blackburn, ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value’, in Morality and Objectivity, ed. Ted Honderich 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 16–18. Proponents of moral perception face a parallel challenge. See Daniel 
Crow, ‘The Mystery of Moral Perception’, Journal of Moral Philosophy 13, no. 2 (2016): 187–210, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681053. 
64 For full discussion, see Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199290652.001.0001. NB I’m remaining neutral on whether 
there are exceptionless generalizations linking non-moral and moral. 
65 Compare MacBrayer’s and Preston Werner’s responses on behalf of moral perception. McBrayer, ‘Moral Perception 
and the Causal Objection’; Werner, ‘Moral Perception without (Prior) Moral Knowledge’. 
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5.3 The Unreliability Objection 
Even if we accept the basic idea that emotions can track moral properties, the Unreliability 
Objection questions whether they do so reliably. Morally irrelevant factors (e.g., mood, phobias) 
frequently influence our emotions, leading to mismatches between emotion and moral property. 
This threatens to render our emotion-based judgments too unreliable to constitute knowledge.66 
In response, I suspect that a competent judge will need to cultivate an implicit sense of when 
her emotions can be trusted and when they cannot. If she withholds judgment when conditions are 
unfavorable, then her emotion-based beliefs can be reliable even if her emotions are erratic.67 
Another response, offered by Terence Cuneo and Adam Pelser, is to concede that emotions only 
provide a route to moral knowledge for exceptionally virtuous agents who aren’t prone to these 
kinds of unreliability.68 A third response, offered by Catherine Elgin, sees emotions not as yielding 
knowledge straightaway, but as providing defeasible starting points for a process of reflective 
equilibrium, which can achieve knowledge in the long-run by ironing out inconsistencies.69 In short, 
there are a range of promising responses to the Unreliability Objection. 
I conclude that philosophers seeking to vindicate moral knowledge should not shy away 
from pursuing Emotional Intuitionism. More work is needed to build a positive case for emotion-
based moral knowledge and to deal fully with these objections, but the prospects of Emotional 
Intuitionism look good in the face of them.70 
6. Conclusion 
A key step in defending moral empiricism is to develop a clear account of what moral experience is. 
I’ve argued that moral empiricists ought to do so by adopting Emotional Intuitionism, the view that 
moral experiences consist of emotions. Emotional Intuitionism provides the best explanation of the 
features we observe in the most compelling putative cases of moral experience. There are several 
viable ways to accommodate putative cases of emotionless moral experience. Moreover, Emotional 
Intuitionism has good prospects for vindicating moral knowledge, because the main objections to 
emotion-based knowledge seem answerable. Still, I haven’t provided a full defense of Emotional 
 
66 See Mikko Salmela, ‘Can Emotion Be Modelled on Perception?’, Dialectica 65, no. 1 (2011): 1–29; András Szigeti, ‘No 
Need to Get Emotional? Emotions and Heuristics’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16, no. 4 (2013): 845–62, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-012-9386-z; Brady, Emotional Insight, 98–101; Pelser, ‘Emotion, Evaluative Perception, 
and Epistemic Justification’. I adopt Pelser’s terminology. 
67 I pursue this idea in further work. Compare Peter Goldie, ‘Emotion, Reason, and Virtue’, in Emotion, Evolution, and 
Rationality, ed. Dylan Evans and Pierre Cruse (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 249–66, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof; Dancy, ‘Intuition and Emotion’, 803. 
68 Cuneo, ‘Signs of Value’; Pelser, ‘Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification’. 
69 Catherine Z. Elgin, ‘Emotion and Understanding’, in Epistemology and Emotions, ed. Georg Brun, Ulvi Doğuoğlu, and 
Dominique Kuenzle (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 33–59. 
70 One objection I haven’t discussed, which we might dub the Necessity Objection, is that it’s unclear how Emotional 
Intuitionism (or any other form of moral empiricism) can account for knowledge of the necessity of moral truths. See, 
e.g., Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785; repr., Hamburg: Meiner, 2016), 4:389 and passim. The 
Emotional Intuitionist’s best response is probably to draw a comparison with our a posteriori knowledge of nomological 
necessities in science. Compare Milona, ‘Intellect versus Affect’, 2270–73. 
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Intuitionism here. It remains a task for future research to deal fully with the objections and, 
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